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7.1  Introduction 
The measurement of capital market integration in the Pacific Basin typically 
takes the form of tests of interest rate parity conditions, the extent of interest 
rate  covariations, or  estimates  of  the  savings  retention coefficient of  the 
Feldstein-Horioka type. Unfortunately, the conclusions derived from differing 
approaches typically do not agree. For instance, Chinn and Frankel (1994) and 
Dooley and Mathieson  (1994) concluded that capital mobility  is relatively 
high, although not complete, in most East Asian countries. Glick and Hutchi- 
son (1990) concluded, on the basis of real interest differentials, that capital 
mobility is increasing over time, although parity does not hold. On the other 
hand, Kim (1993) found that the savings retention coefficient indicates rela- 
tively low capital mobility for a number of these countries. 
In this paper, we attempt to reconcile these seemingly contradictory results 
by  arguing that for some questions, the wrong asset returns have been exam- 
ined. We appeal to the stylized fact that most firms in both developed countries 
and less developed countries (LDCs) rely on bank credit, rather than some type 
of  tradable debt instrument such as commercial paper. Even in  the United 
States, the share of business borrowing accounted for by commercial paper is 
only about 15 percent (Becketti and Moms 1993, 73). Moreover, recent work 
has demonstrated that access to this market is largely restricted to larger firms. 
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Small firms rely  much  more  heavily  on  bank  loans  (Gertler and Gilchrist 
1994). 
Consequently, capital market integration depends on the extent to which 
bank credit is highly substitutable across different countries. Tests of covered 
interest parity using highly tradable money market returns will capture some 
relevant measure of capital market integration only to the degree that either (1) 
commercial paper supplies a large proportion of total business borrowing or 
(2) bank loans are highly substitutable for these assets. To the extent that bank 
loans constitute a large portion of borrowing, and neither of  the above condi- 
tions holds, this type of asset nontradableness may explain an observed high 
savings retention coefficient (Dooley, Frankel, and Mathieson 1987). 
The issue of whether capital is effectively mobile or immobile has recently 
taken on increased prominence in light of recent debates regarding the optimal 
response to capital inflows. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) have  ar- 
gued that sterilization of  capital inflows is difficult because of  high capital 
mobility. Reisen (1993) has argued, on the basis of  East Asian experience, 
to the contrary. We  argue that sterilization is possible because capital is not 
completely mobile (in contrast to Reisen), because the market in bank lending 
is  not  well  integrated with  either  other  domestic  or  international capital 
markets. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 7.2 we update and review the 
evidence regarding capital market integration in East Asia. This assessment 
includes updated calculations of covered interest and interest differentials. We 
contrast and compare these results over time. In section 7.3, we  describe the 
behavior of bank lending rates in these countries, especially as they compare 
to those in developed countries. Section 7.4 outlines a simple model in which 
to analyze the effect of capital inflows on bank lending. Empirical testing of 
this model is implemented, and the relationship between bank lending and 
economic activity (as compared to the role of  money) is evaluated. The fact 
that credit has a greater effect than money provides a reason why capital mobil- 
ity has been mismeasured in the past-the  wrong interest rate has been exam- 
ined. Section 7.5 assesses the role of capital inflows in inducing rapid expan- 
sion of bank lending and consequent financial fragility. Section 7.6 concludes. 
7.2  What the Conventional Measures Imply 
The most common measure of capital market integration is the magnitude 
of the covered interest differential. For the case where political risk is zero and 
assets are exactly alike in default, liquidity, and maturity characteristics, cov- 
ered interest rate parity should hold: 
1. Frankel (1994) has suggested the nontraded aspect of  bank loans as a possible reason why 
countries that have not liberalized their financial systems can sterilize. 171  Asia Pacific Capital Markets 
Table 7.1  Covered Interest Differentials (percentage points) 
1982:09-1988:04  1988:05-1994:ll 
Mean  Mean 
Country  Mean  Absolute  Mean  Absolute 
Australia  -0.20  0.88  0.27  0.29 
Canada  -0.01  0.16  0.10  0.22 
Hong Kong  0.11  0.20  0.14  0.17 
Japan"  0.08  0.14  0.01  0.05 
Malaysia  -1.41  1.51  -0.01  1.28 
New Zealand  -0.49  1.63  0.27  0.30 
Singapore  -0.47  0.49  -0.91  0.9 1 
Note:  Figures in  percentage points, estimated by  regressing the end-of-month covered interest 
differential on a constant. 
TD-Euroyen differential. Data up to 1986:09 is Gensaki rate. Estimate is from a regression with 
a dummy for Gensaki series, so that the differential is interpretable as that pertaining to a CD rate. 
where s, is the log spot exchange rate, f  is the forward rate at time t for a trade 
k periods hence, i: is the k-period interest rate, and a superscript e(*)  denotes 
a local (foreign) variable. In table 7.1, the mean and mean absolute covered 
interest differentials for seven Pacific Rim countries are reported for two sub- 
samples: 1982:09-1988:04 and 1988:05-1994: 11. (The first subsample corre- 
sponds to that examined by Frankel 1990). The mean differentials indicate that 
the extent of  political risk, assessed using money market rates,2 is quite low, 
and hence financial capital mobility is high but not complete. Since averages 
can mask deviations of opposite sign, we also report mean absolute deviations. 
Particularly in the early period, there are substantial differentials for Australia, 
Malaysia, and New Zealand. In the latter period, most of these figures are ap- 
proximately the same or smaller. The exceptions are notable. Malaysia still 
appears  somewhat  insulated.  Even  more  surprising,  Singapore,  typically 
thought of as well integrated into world markets via the Asian dollar market, 
evinces an increased absolute differential of approximately 1.25 per~ent.~ 
Since forward markets are usually well developed in cases where the extent 
of capital and exchange controls are minimal (and political risk, observable or 
unobservable, is low), the use of the covered interest parity criterion begs the 
question of capital mobility. In principle, one could try to assess the degree to 
which uncovered interest parity holds, using the rational expectations method- 
ology of substituting the ex post values of depreciation for the ex ante. Such a 
2. See appendix A for a description of the money market rates examined. 
3. See Woo and Hirayama (1995) for a discussion of imperfect capital mobility in the cases of 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. 172  Menzie D. Chinn and Michael Dooley 
Table 7.2  Interest Differentials  (percentage points) 
1982:09-1988:04  1988:05-1994: 11 
Mean  Mean 





























































Note: Figures in percentage points, obtained by regressing the local minus O.S.  Eurodollar interest 
differentials on a constant. 
aCD-Euroyen  differential. Data up to 1986:09 is Gensaki rate. Estimate is from a regression with 
a dummy for Gensaki series, so that the differential is interpretable as that pertaining to a CD rate. 
bMonetary Stabilization Board (MSB) rate until 1991:  12; call money rate thereafter. Estimate is 
from a regression with a dummy for call money series, so that the differential is interpretable as 
that pertaining to an MSB rate. 
'Call  money rate until  1991:12; Bangkok Interbank Offer Rate (BIBOR) thereafter. Estimate is 
from a regression with a dummy for BIBOR series, so that the differential is interpretable as that 
pertaining to a call money rate. 
procedure yields implausibly negative estimates of the response of the domes- 
tic interest rate to the foreign plus expected depreciation (excepting  the pegged 
case of  Hong Kong). This result obtains because most variation in spot ex- 
change rates is unanticipated. A different issue arises when the expected spot 
rate is proxied by a forecast from a rolling ARIMA. This procedure results in 
very  small estimates of the coefficient, so that uncovered interest rate parity 
does not hold: 
One alternative is to adopt the assumption that the exchange rate is a driftless 
random walk (as in Faruqee 1992), so that expected depreciation is zero. In- 
spection of the local minus Eurodollar interest rate differentials, reported in 
table 7.2, indicates that there is scant evidence of convergence. Certain coun- 
tries, notably Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia, continue to show marked devia- 
tions. 
Other studies, also using money market rates, have shown increasing capital 
4. An alternative approach is to use survey data to measure expected depreciation. In Chinn and 
Frankel (1994), uncovered interest rate parity was statistically rejected for all the Pacific Basin 
currencies examined. 173  Asia Pacific Capital Markets 

























































Notes; End-of-year outstanding stocks, in billions of domestic currency units. Commercial paper 
and money market figures from Emery (1991). Total credit to private sector is from International 
Monetary Fund, Znternarional Financial Statistics (line 32d). 
"Data for 1989.111. 
b1990  figures for commercial paper and money market from Takagi (1993). 
'Commercial paper and money market figures are volume. 
dEstimate from Emery (1991). 
'Total  (financial and nonfinancial) credit from Post (1992). 
mobility. Dooley and Mathieson (1994) demonstrated that foreign interest rates 
have had an increasing role in affecting various Pacific Basin interest rates. 
Jwa (1994) and Reisen and Ykches (1993) have applied similar methodologies 
to Korea and Taiwan and found episodic openings and  closing^.^ 
A more fundamental question arises from the possibility that these interest 
rates are not representative of those that govern the economy, particularly in- 
vestment behavior. These rates, typically interbank deposit or CD rates, are 
highly tradable and may obtain in extremely thin markets. Nonfinancial firms 
must borrow either through the commercial paper market or from the banking 
system. The commercial paper rate is likely to closely follow these interbank 
rates, ifthat market exists. However, in these countries most enterprise or firm 
borrowing is typically through the banking sector. As indicated in table 7.3, 
commercial paper constitutes a small fraction of total credit extended in most 
of these countries. 
Commercial paper is most visible in Korea and Taiwan (as measured by 
ratio to total credit extended by the consolidated banking system to the private 
sector). Perhaps this is because of the highly regulated nature of the banking 
sector in these two countries. Still, even the commercial paper market is regu- 
lated; data for Taiwanese commercial paper rates are not available, so the ex- 
5. In contrast, Chinn and Maloney (1996) found individual and sustained breaks in the relation- 
ship between domestic interest rates and domestic determinants in these countries. 174  Menzie D.  chi^ and Michael Dooley 
tent of intervention is difficult to assess. However, in Korea, the three-month 
investment and finance bilkommercial paper rate shows barely any variation 
over time. In most of the other countries, the commercial paper ratios are sub- 
stantially smaller. 
We  proceed under the assumption that most borrowing will be conducted 
through local banking systems. Foreign banking has some role, but by  and 
large, in those countries with high proportions of foreign bank lending to non- 
banks, most of that lending appears to be directed toward the public sector.6 
7.3  Interbank Rates versus Bank Loan Rates 
A natural procedure would be to consider lending rate differentials, adjusted 
by the forward rate or expected depreciation, as the measure of capital mobil- 
ity. Alternatively, one could examine how movements in offshore rates induce 
comovements in bank lending rates. Something like this approach was adopted 
in Browne and McNelis (1990) for the case of Ireland. They showed that bank 
rates are not very sensitive to changes in offshore rates, thereby suggesting that 
bank credit is an asset that is not very tradable. 
There are two key difficulties with this approach. First, LDC banking sys- 
tems are usually highly regulated, thereby making the market-determined lend- 
ing rate unobservable. Second, even in the absence of government intervention, 
bank loan rates are “sticky” due to the special functions performed by banks, 
specifically the screening and monitoring of projects (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). 
Thus, even in the absence of banking sector liberalization, one would expect 
time variation in the spread between the riskless rate and the bank lending 
rate due to the agency costs of  external finance (e.g., Gertler, Hubbard, and 
Kashyap 1991). 
This variation in “stickiness” is confirmed by  visual inspection of  time- 
series plots of interbank and loan rates (see figs. 7.1-7.13).  In the United States, 
the prime rate follows the Fed Funds rate, by and large. At the opposite pole is 
the Korean loan rate, which barely moves even as the interbank rate moves 
widely. In this latter case, the bank rate is obviously highly regulated and hence 
appeal to market-determined (although not necessarily market clearing) rates 
is clearly uncalled  The same is true of the Taiwanese rate, while the Thai 
6.  Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand all exhibit declining ratios of foreign 
bank lending to the sum of domestic bank credit and foreign bank lending to nonbanks. For these 
countries, the presence of  foreign bank lending represents about 30, 15, 5, 15, and 10 percent, 
respectively, of total lending. Part of this pattern is due to the changing value of the dollar. Indone- 
sia (at the end of  1992). in particular, exhibits an especially high ratio due to the large amount of 
borrowing by the state-owned oil enterprise. At the end of the Marcos regime the Philippines had 
a ratio of 60 percent (presumably mostly government borrowing). The ratio has since come down 
to under 20 percent. For purposes of comparison, the U.S. ratio is 8 percent. 
7. Although Korea has implemented several banking reform efforts, they have been of a hesitant 
nature. See the discussion in Park (1994, esp.  147-54).  The Taiwanese banking system has re- 
mained dominated by  government-owned banks, so that despite interest rate decontrol, rates re- 
main largely insulated from market pressures (Shea 1994, 259). 175  Asia Pacific Capital Markets 
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Fig. 7.1  United States: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
Note:  See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
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Fig. 7.2  Australia: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
Note;  See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
rate is a less extreme version. Between these two polar cases are the Singa- 
porean, Indonesian, Malaysian, and Japanese series. 
Recently, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) have provided a measure of  rate 
stickiness estimated from a regression of changes in bank lending rates on the 
change in the discount rate, on a distributed lag of changes in the money mar- 
ket rate, and on the changes in lagged bank rates. De Brouwer (1995)  estimated 
a similar specification to several Pacific Basin countries. Using our data set 176  Menzie D.  chi^ and Michael Dooley 
21,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  J 
03  04  05  06  07  00  09  90 91  92 93 94 
I -  ICN  -.-... IBLCN  I 
Fig. 7.3  Canada: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
Note; See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
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Fig. 7.4  Hong Kong: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
Nore: See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
(which differs in sample period from the others), we estimate the following 
equation: 
,=I  i=  1 
where p is the bank loan rate and id is the discount rate. 
Table 7.4 presents the results, as well as those reported by  de Brouwer. 
While the estimates differ somewhat, they show the same general pattern. Us- 
ing these estimates, a reasonable categorization of covariability would be: 177  Asia Pacific Capital Markets 
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Fig. 7.5  Singapore: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
Nore: See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
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Fig. 7.6  Japan: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
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Fig. 7.7  Malaysia: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
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Fig. 7.8  New Zealand: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
Note:  See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
The group 1 countries appear to coincide with countries believed to have 
small covered interest differentials and high capital mobility. Consequently, 
one might be tempted to deduce that the same conclusions would be obtained 
regardless of  whether money market or bank lending rates were used. How- 
ever, the group 2 countries of New Zealand and Japan also fall into the small 
covered differential camp. The stickiness in bank loan rates could be driven 179  Asia Pacific Capital Markets 
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Fig. 7.9  Philippines: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
Note; See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
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Fig. 7.10 
Note; See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
Indonesia: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
by  differences in the portfolio of projects facing banks in these countries, by 
differences in monitoring technologies, as well as by  bank rate regulations, 
none of which are factors typically identified with capital mobility. Hence, it 
is not possible to determine whether these markets are integrated by inspecting 
the correlations among lending rates. In fact, we  take as our prior that these 
portions of  the capital market are not well integrated with offshore markets 180  Menzie D.  Chinn and Michael Dooley 
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Fig. 7.11 
Note: See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
Korea: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
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Fig. 7.12  Taiwan: interbank and loan rates (percent) 
Note: See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
(and the rest of the economy). Recent work by  Reisen (1993) has suggested 
that exactly because several East Asian countries have reversed the order of 
liberalization to put external reform before internal financial reform, steriliza- 
tion is fairly easy. Frankel (1994) has pointed out that this result relies on as- 
sumptions about the nature of the disturbance affecting the country of interest. 41,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  1 
83  84  85 86  a7  aa  89  90 91 92 93 94 
~  ITH2  IBLTHI 
Fig. 7.13  Thailand: interbank and loan rate (percent) 
Note: See appendix A for key to abbreviations. 
Table 7.4  Estimates of Bank Loan Rate Stickiness 
de Brouwer 
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0.37  0.76 
0.54  0.80 
0.69 
0.08  0.44 






























Notes: Coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. “Impact” is the within-quarter coefficient. 
“Long run” is the estimate obtained from 6,/6,.  The de Brouwer estimates are averages for the 
suhsamples that most closely conform to that used in the estimates in the left-hand columns. Esti- 
mates for Japan are short-term (s), unspecified, and long-term (1). 182  Menzie D. Chinn and Michael Dooley 
7.4  Application of a Simple Model 
7.4.1  Derivation of a Model with Credit 
Consider an economy where bank credit is imperfectly substitutable for 
bond finance, as in Bernanke and Blinder (1988), augmented by allowing the 
credit supply to depend on a shift variable, the “riskiness” of  the marginal 
investment project. Banks hold liabilities of deposits. On the asset side, banks 
hold loans, reserves, and domestic government debt. 
Loan demand is given by 
(3) 
Loan supply is given by 
(4) 
Ld = L(p,  i, y), 
-++ 
L”  = X(p,  i, Z)D(l -  T), 
+-- 
where Z is a measure of  the riskiness of the marginal investment project. The 
data-generating process of 2 is not modeled explicitly. The credit market equi- 
librium is given by equating loan supply and demand. 
The money market equilibrium is given by equating the demand for deposits 
with the supply; hence the LM  schedule is 
D(i,  y) = mR, 
- 
where m is the money multiplier and R is the stock of reserves. (Excess reserves 
are  ignored  in  this  analysis.) The  money  multiplier  is  assumed  constant. 
Allowing it to depend positively on the interest rate does not change the quali- 
tative conclusions. 
The open economy IS curve is conventional, except that it depends on the 
bank lending rate as well as the interest rate: 
where q is the real exchange rate. Substituting money market equilibrium into 
the loan market equilibrium yields 
(7)  Up,  i, y) = X(p,  i, z)mR(1 -  7). 
Solving for the equilibrium loan rate, p,  one obtains 
In this formulation, the spread between the bank loan rate and the risk-free rate 
(proxied by  a tradable interest rate), p -  i, is a positive function of  Z,  the 
riskiness of the marginal project. The CC schedule is obtained by substituting 
equation (8) into equation (6): 183  Asia Pacific Capital Markets 
i 
LM 
BP = 0 
cc 
1 
Fig. 7.14  CC-LM-BP model 
(9) 
The external equilibrium condition is conventional: 
(10)  BP  = KA(i -  i* -  As",  X) + TB(q,  y) = 0, 
where X is a vector of exogenous variables, such as default risk and so forth, 
which may shift the KA  function. Assuming that the responsiveness of  capital 
flows to the interest differential is not infinite, then the BP = 0 schedule is 
upward sloping, and domestic interest rates may deviate from the world inter- 
est rate. 
Such a model yields figure 7.14. 
This model resembles the conventional Mundell-Fleming model, except that 
unsterilized capital inflows cause increases in deposits, which in turn shift out 
both the LM  and the CC schedules. The extent to which they shift out depends 
on the magnitudes of the parameters. (The solution to this model is presented 
in app. B.)*  Also, the CC curve is drawn fairly steep, to reflect the presumption 
that economic activity is relatively insensitive to the interest rate on tradable 
assets. 
7.4.2  Implications of a Capital Inflow for Bank Lending 
Assume an exogenous shock lowers the rate of return in the rest of the world 
(i*).  Ceteris paribus, the BP = 0 schedule shifts down, and foreign capital will 
tend to flow into the country. The capital inflows take the form of a deposit in 
the home-country bank. Deposits rise, as do reserves. Since excess reserves 
yield zero interest, the bank will not hold any excess reserves. This means that 
bank loans increase, and both the CC and LM  curves shift out. Interest rates 
8. For a slightly different treatment, see Spiegel (1995). 184  Menzie D. Chinn and Michael Dooley 
and lending rates may rise or fall depending on the parameters of the model. 
If  expansion causes banks to undertake lending to riskier projects, this must 
drive up lending rates or drive down deposit rates. The second tendency will 
reestablish interest parity in the deposit market with perhaps small changes in 
domestic lending. 
The central bank can sterilize the capital inflow, but in this case the increase 
in the commercial banks’ assets consist of claims on the government rather 
than bank loans to the private sector. Since the government liability is riskless 
there is no change in the wedge between  interbank  deposit  and loan rates. 
Thus, all the adjustment must come in the risk premium on domestic deposits, 
which is, of  course, zero if domestic and foreign deposits are perfect substi- 
tutes. This is the risk premium that most research has been unable to find- 
hence the belief that capital is mobile. The implication is that the central bank 
will give up since sterilization is not effective. In the typical model, domestic 
credit expands and domestic deposit and loan rates will fall to match foreign 
interest rates. In our model, the domestic deposit rate is driven down, but the 
domestic loan rate might rise with only a very small expansion of  domestic 
bank loans. Thus, if  we are interested  in  the effects of  capital mobility, we 
should look directly at changes in bank credit rather than interest rates. Notice 
also that if the government does “sterilize,” the domestic money supply might 
rise with no change in bank credit to the private sector. If the view that bank 
credit is special is right, then there might be no impact on investment. 
We test two predictions of the model. First, in countries that have not under- 
taken sterilization policies the response of domestic lending to the capital in- 
flow should be positive. Second, economic activity responds  more strongly 
to bank lending than to money in countries where bank loans are not highly 
substitutable with other lending. 
The response of bank lending to the private sector is evaluated first. The 
change in bank credit to the private sector is regressed on current and lagged 
capital inflows (not including direct investment): 
4 
(11)  A(BCA‘), = p,  + xri  (KA/Y)-i  + quarterly dummies + u,, 
r=O 
where BC is bank credit extended to the private sector, Y is gross domestic 
product, and KA  is capital inflows minus direct investment. 
The results are reported in table 7.5. Impact parameters are reported in col- 
umn (1).  Column (2) is the sum of the inflow parameters. “Wald” denotes a 
chi-squared test statistic for the null hypothesis that the sum of coefficients on 
the inflows is zero. Notice that the proportion of  variance explained is quite 
low in certain cases, notably Indonesia. 
The results confirm Glick and Moreno’s (1994) conclusion that Indonesia 
and Malaysia engaged in large-scale sterilization of capital inflows. That is, in 
response to capital inflows, some of the reduction of  bank credit was mani- 
fested in a reduction in bank lending to the private sector. Taiwan, Korea, and 185  Asia Pacific Capital Markets 
Table 7.5  Response of Bank Credit to Capital Inflows 
ro  ZK  R2  D-W  N  Wale 
- 































-0.01  1.49  54 
0.22  1.53  53 
-0.07  1.03  49 
0.15  2.20  53 
0.95  2.13  53 
0.17  1.69  51 
0.18  2.51  33 
0.58  1.93  33 
0.33  1.36  52 











Note: Coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. 
"Wald is an F-test for the null hypothesis that Z,r,  = 0 (p-values in brackets). 
bBank credit data not available. Estimates for total domestic credit. 
Malaysia evidenced short-run (within-quarter) reductions. Indonesia and Ma- 
laysia have negative long-run estimated impacts. 
These estimates of  nonstructural relationships are seldom statistically sig- 
nificant. Only in a few cases are the positive parameters statistically significant 
(Canada, New Zealand, and Thailand). The negative effects are always statisti- 
cally insignificant, except in the case of Indonesia, where something else ap- 
pears to be going on. Certain accounts indicate that domestic banking crises 
caused rapid reductions in bank lending. To a certain extent, one would not 
expect statistically significant coefficient estimates because the change in bank 
lending to capital inflows depends on the intervention response function of the 
central bank, which is unlikely to be constant over time. 
7.4.3 
Previous analyses have implicitly assumed that money and bonds are the 
only two domestic assets of importance in LDCs. Consequently, money market 
interest rates  were  the appropriate variables  of  analysis. In the framework 
adopted in this paper, there  are three domestic assets  of  interest-money, 
bonds, and bank credit. We find that financial indicators of risk do seem to 
respond to capital inflows. We now investigate whether credit has significant 
effects on the economy, above and beyond the effect of money. Hence, we ask 
whether omitting the banking sector's behavior misses a crucial aspect of capi- 
tal market integration. 
The role of credit has enjoyed a revival in the recent literature pioneered by 
Lown (1988) and extended by Romer and Romer (1990), Friedman and Kut- 
tner (1993), and Loungani and Rush (1995). These researchers implemented 
nonstructural regressions, often in the tradition of the St. Louis monetary equa- 
tions. Romer and Romer found that bank credit was a significant determinant 
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of U.S. industrial o~tput.~  Friedman and Kuttner concurred, although they ar- 
gued that relative prices (in particular the T-bilVcommercia1  paper spread) mat- 
ter as much as the credit quantities. More recent work involving structural 
VARs has been implemented by,  among others, Fackler and Rogers (1993). 
They also have concluded that  “credit is at least as important as any other 
variable in explaining movements in output, prices and interest rates” (223). 
To assess whether this conclusion also applies to Pacific Basin countries, we 
estimate the following regressions of changes in income on lagged changes in 
real bank credit or narrow money (Ml), real exchange rates, and income: 
The results are reported in table 7.6 for those countries for which data are 
available. 
The results indicate that for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, 
and Taiwan, money is more positively correlated with output than bank credit 
(although the sum of the coefficients is seldom statistically significantly differ- 
ent from zero). Of these countries, all have low degrees of bank rate stickiness, 
excepting Taiwan. Japan, Korea, and the Philippines show the reverse pattern 
and at the same time exhibit relatively high rates of stickiness. Unfortunately, 
three of the most interesting countries-Indonesia,  Malaysia, and Thailmd- 
are missing either quarterly bank credit data for a sufficiently long period or 
quarterly GDP data, thereby making comparisons for these countries impos- 
sible. 
Since savings-investment correlations have long occupied economists’ inter- 
est, we decided also to investigate the effects of money and credit on invest- 
ment. Adequate data were available only for Australia, Canada, Japan, and Ko- 
rea.  Of  these,  two  have  low  stickiness  (Australia  and  Canada),  one has 
intermediate (Japan), and one has a very high degree (Korea). Our prior expec- 
tations are therefore that Australia and Canada would have a higher association 
between money and investment than between bank credit and investment; on 
the other hand, Korea, and to a lesser extent Japan, should evidence the reverse. 
Regressions of changes of investment on lagged changes in narrow money 
or bank credit, GDP, and the real exchange rate were estimated: 
k  k  k 
Ainv, = 0,  + CB!A~C,-~  + C+,Ay,-,  + Cq,Aq,-, + wr, 
where inv is log real investment in plant and equipment. 
9. In more recent work, however, Romer and Romer (1993) argued that due to decreased Fed 
reliance on credit controls, the influence of  credit on economic activity has decreased. Table 7.6  Response of Output to Bank Credit or Money 
- 
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Nore: Coefficients  can be interpreted as elasticities. 
'Number of lags in the regression. 
bBreusch-Gcdfrey LM test for serial correlation of order 4 (p-values in brackets). 
'Estimated using a filter of  (1 -  L4)  (1 -  L). 
dEstimated  using a filter of  (1 -  L4). 
*Significant at the 10 percent marginal significance level according to an F-test for the null hy- 
pothesis that c,a,  = 0 or Z,T,  = 0 (p-values in brackets). 
**Significant at the 5 percent marginal significance level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent marginal significance  level. 188  Menzie D. Chinn and Michael Dooley 
Table 7.7 
Country  C,e,  c,O,  k'  R2  LM(4)b  N  Sample 


























































1981  .II-1994.III 
1981  .II-1994.III 
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Note: Coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. 
aNumber  of lags in the regression. 
bBreusch-Godfrey  LM test for serial correlation of  order 4 (p-values in brackets). 
*Significant at the 10 percent marginal significance level according to an F-test for the null hy- 
pothesis that CEO,  = 0 or  = 0 (p-values in brackets). 
**Significant at the 5 percent marginal significance level. 
***Significant  at the 1 percent marginal significance level. 
The results are presented in table 7.7. They conform to expectations: for 
Australia and Canada, the money coefficients are jointly statistically signifi- 
cant, while the bank credit coefficients sum to a negative number and are not 
significant. For both Japan and Korea, bank credit is positively associated with 
investment, while money is not. However, it is important to note that only the 
Japanese bank credit coefficients are jointly significant. 
7.5  Bank Lending and Increasing Financial Fragility 
A common view is that countries that rapidly expand their domestic lending 
to the private sector will tend to have riskier portfolios of investment projects. 
Thailand has large shares of  bank credit extended to risky construction and 
real estate sectors, while both Indonesia and Malaysia have experienced prob- 
lems with large amounts of nonperforming loans (see Folkerts-Landau et al. 
Another means of assessing the riskiness of bank loan portfolios is to exam- 
ine the spread between the lending rate and the risk-free rate. In this model, in 
the absence of bank rate regulation, the spread between the bank lending rate 
and the risk-free rate (p -  i) is an increasing function of the riskiness of the 
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Table 7.8  Response of Spread to Growth of Bank Credit to Private Sector 
- 
Country  KO  KI  R?  D-W  N 
Australia  0.038**  -0.053  -  .04  0.76  49 
Canada  0.009  0.166**  0.24  0.66  48 
Indonesia  0.043**  -0.135  0.03  1.14  44 
Japan  -  0.043* *  0.035  -.08  1.13  48 
New Zealand  0.019**  0.064**  0.25  0.69  31 
Philippines  0.012  0.030  -  .09  1.23  26 
Singapore  0.090**  0.190**  0.3  1  0.62  31 
(0.019)  (0.12  1) 
(0.007)  (0.066) 
(0.022)  (0.156) 
(0.016)  (0.087) 
(0.008)  (0.029) 
(0.022)  (0.073) 
(0.009)  (0.084) 
Notes; Dependent variable is the  spread between the bank lending and money market rates, in 
decimal form. All standard errors estimated assuming N/3 independent observations. 
*Significant at the 10 percent marginal significance level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent marginal significance level. 
marginal investment project, Z. We posit that rapid expansion of bank credit is 
associated with riskier and riskier projects. This suggests that a regression of 
the spread on lagged bank lending will yield a positive coefficient (for coun- 
tries where the bank lending rate is not regulated; hence Korea and Taiwan 
are omitted): 
(14)  (p -  i),  = K,,  + K] [(BC/Y),-, -  (BC/Y),_,]  + quarterly dummies + v,. 
The results of these regressions are reported in table 7.8. Because there is evi- 
dence of serial correlation in almost all the regressions, the standard errors are 
calculated assuming N13 independent observations.  Adoption of this procedure 
means that we have been extremely conservative in our inferences. 
For Australia, the estimate is negative but not statistically significant. For 
Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore, the estimates are statistically significant 
and positive. This pattern of  results is reassuring because these are banking 
systems relatively free from rate regulation. In the cases of  Indonesia, Japan, 
and the Philippines, the estimates are not statistically significant, although for 
the latter two they are positive. 
These results suggest that the rapid expansion of lending, in the absence of 
government regulation of bank lending rates, leads to increases in the spread 
between the lending rate and the interbank deposit rate. Since the results are 
not statistically significant, one would not wish to overinterpret the numbers; 
in fact, in many countries with more highly regulated banking sectors, the 
spread may depend more critically on differing money and nonmoney deposit 190  Menzie D. Chinn and Michael Dooley 
reserve requirements. As is well known, manipulation of reserve requirements 
has been a favorite means of effecting sterilization in several of these econo- 
mies. Dooley and Chinn (1995) have examined this issue. 
7.6  Concluding Remarks 
The policy implications of opening capital markets continue to attract atten- 
tion and debate primarily because we do not understand much about the trans- 
mission process for monetary policy in developing countries. It seems to us 
plausible that the “bank credit is special” argument, which has received con- 
siderable attention in the United  States in recent years, is quite likely to be 
relevant in this transmission process. Moreover, developing countries that en- 
gage in large amounts of sterilized intervention provide a natural way to test the 
relative importance of money and credit. The model developed also provides a. 
plausible reason why interest differentials on traded bank deposits are a largely 
uninformative indicator of the degree of dependence of bank credit and in turn 




Eurocurrency Deposit Rates 
The U.S., U.K., and Japanese three-month Eurocurrency deposit rates were 
the arithmetic average of the bid and offer rates in London at close of market, 
as reported by Bank of America up to 6 October 1986, and Reuters’ Informa- 
tion Service thereafter, and recorded by Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) in the DRI- 
FACS database. 
Local Market Rates 
See table 7A. 1. 
Local Bank Lending Rates 
See table 7A.2. 
Exchange Rates 
End-of-period  exchange rates (except those indicated below) are London 
3 P.M.,  arithmetic average of  bid and offer rates as reported by Barclay’s until 191  Asia Pacific Capital Markets 
Table 7A.1  Local Market Rates 










































Financial paper, industrial firms, 
3-month Eurodollar rate 
90-day bank bill, quote 
3-month prime finance company 
Paper 
3-month  interbank  deposit  rate 
corrected by FEER data 
I-month interbank deposit rate 
3-month Gensaki bond rate 
3-month CD rate 
IJP to 1986:09; IP2  thereafter 
3-month Euroyen rate 
3-month finance and investment 
90  days 
bill rate; later same as 
commercial paper rate 
thereafter 
MSB until  1991:12; call money 
3-month interbank deposit rate 
3-month commercial bills to 
1987:12; 90-day bank bills 
thereafter 
3-month T-bill at tender 
3-month banker's acceptances to 
1987:08; 3-month commercial 
bills thereafter 
90-day banker's  acceptances 




















Sources: DRI, Data Resources, Inc.; WFM, World Financial Markets, published by Morgan Guar- 
anty; WFMr, Morgan Guaranty data, as provided by Carlton Strong; IFS, International Financial 
Statistics, published by the International Monetary Fund; FEER, Far Eastern Economic Review. 
aWhere  source is both WFM and DRI, then WFM is source until 1989: 10, at which time DRIFACS 
is source. 
end of  March  1990, at which time the series is no longer recorded by  DRI- 
FACS. Thereafter, the London close rate is used, as reported by Reuters Infor- 
mation Services. A consistent series is not used (i.e., the London close all the 
way) because these series only begin in 1986. The Taiwanese exchange rate 
series is from Ramon Moreno at the Federal Reserve Bank of  San Francisco 
until  1991:12, and from DRIFACS thereafter. The market exchange rates for 
Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand were obtained from the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS).  (The Thai 
series is an official rate.) For conversion of dollar values to domestic currency, 
period average exchange rates from IFS (line rf)  are used. 192  Menzie D. Chinn and Michael Dooley 
Table 7A.2  Local Bank Lending Rates 
Country  Sourcea 
Variable 
















WFMr  (Reserve Bank  of 




WFMr (Bank of  Japan) 
WFMr (Bank of Japan) 
WFMr (Bank of Korea) 
WFMr (Bank Negara) 




WFMr (Central Bank of 
WFMr (Bank of Thailand) 
Authority of  Singapore) 
China) 
Prime rate, JP Morgan 
Overdraft rate of major 
trading banks 
Chartered bank prime rate 
Prime lending rate 
Weighted average lending 
rate working capital of 
nonproprietary sector 
Shoa-term prime rate 
Long-term prime rate 
Minimum lending rate 
charged to general 
enterprises by deposit 
banks 
Base lending rate 




Overdraft rate of major 
banks 
Short-term lending rate; 
ma.  for up to one year 















Sources: See note to table 7A. 1. 
“Where  source is both WFM and DRI, then WFM is source until 1989: 10, at which time DRIFACS 
is source. 
output 
Quarterly  gross domestic product  (output) in nominal  and real terms are 
from ZFS  (March 1995 CD-ROM). Nominal Malaysia, New Zealand, and Sin- 
gapore GDP figures estimated via regression on real output and CPI. Indonesia 
and Thailand figures estimated via a four-quarter moving average of  annual 
rates. Hong Kong GDP data from Census and Statistics Department, Revised 
Estimates of  GDP, 1961 to First Quartel; 1994 (Hong Kong, August  1994). 
Taiwan data from Directorate-General of  Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan,  Republic  of  China, Quarterly National Economics Trends 
(Taipei, various issues). 
Credit and International Banking Statistics 
Bank credit to private sector is from IFS (line 52d, if  available; line 22d 
otherwise). Domestic credit to the private sector is from ZFS (line 32d). Foreign 193  Asia Pacific Capital Markets 
credit to nonbanks (reported in n. 6)  is from IFS  (table 7yrd), converted to 
domestic currency using the average market exchange rate. 
Capital Flows 
All figures are from IFS, except those for Taiwan, which are obtained from 
the Central Bank of  China, FinanciaE Statistics (Taipei, various issues). The 
codes (in both cases) are 
Current account  line 77a.d IFS 
Direct investment  line 77bad IFS 
Portfolio investment  line 77bbd IFS 
Net errors and omissions  line 77e.d IFS 
Other capital, nie  line 77g.d IFS 
The inflow  measure used  in  the paper is  constructed using  the following 
formula: 
INFLOW##l  = XR  X (PI + ER + OC)/GDP, 
where PI, ER, and OC are portfolio investment, net errors, and other capital, 
respectively. XR is the period average exchange rate expressed as foreign cur- 
rency units per U.S. dollar (IFS, line rf). Note that this definition excludes 
direct investment. 
Appendix B 
Derivation of the Open Economy CC-LM Model 
Set dZ = 0. The semireduced form equation representing the CC equation is 
(6') 
Taking the total differential yields 
(Al) 
Rearranging, 
Y = Y(i,  p, 4). 
dY = ydi  + Yp(p,di + pvdY + pRdR) + Y&. 
(A21  dY(l - Q,)  = (I$,  + q)di + YppRdR  + Td4. 
The LM  curve is obtained by differentiating equation (5): 
('43)  dD = m(dR) = D,di + D,dY, 
m = DR. 194  Menzie D. Chinn and Michael Dooley 
Solving for the deposit interest rate, 
('44) 
m(dR) -  DydY 
di = 
9 
Substituting equation ('44) into equation (A2), 
('45) 
Solving for income, 
A -[1  -  Yppy  + (Yppi  + 13Dy/Q]. 
Rather than solving the system including the BP = 0 schedule, assume capital 
flows and real exchange rates to be exogenous. Then in the absence of steriliza- 
tion, dR = dKA, so that the effect of an exogenous capital inflow on income is 
given by 
('47) 
As indicated in the text, both curves shift to the right in response to an unsteril- 
ized capital inflow: 
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Comment  Koichi Hamada 
It is a pleasure to comment on this paper because I think the authors are at 
least moving in the right direction with their approach to the Feldstein-Horioka 
(F-H) puzzle. The puzzle is that the correlation between national savings and 
investment is much higher than the value that the assumption of free capital 
mobility would imply. What I mean by the right direction is the way the authors 
try to decompose structurally capital movements into several components and 
the way they examine the economic mechanisms relating to each component. 
In addition, this paper relates the discussion of the F-H puzzle to two contro- 
versies, the effect of sterilized intervention in the exchange market and whether 
money or credit is more important as the determinant of national investment. 
Visualize the structure of  the F-H puzzle as in the picture in figure 7C.  1. 
Imagine two (or more) tanks full of water (savings) that are connected by vari- 
ous horizontal pipes. The inside of  each tank is invisible from the outside. 
Some of the connecting pipes are transparent as channels of “covered interest 
parity,” where perfect arbitrage takes place in the absence of capital control, 
and some of the pipes are not so transparent. Even in the case of uncovered 
interest parity, the equalization of rates of return is much less obvious than for 
covered interest parity. In the case of foreign direct investment, we know little 
about the exact process of  equalization of  returns  among direct investment 
projects that differ much in the degree of risks. 
If there are no obstacles or complications to prevent the movement of water 
in each tank, the water levels will be equalized if one complete pipe exists. 
Water flowing into one tank (increased savings in one country) will cause a 
substantial shift of water from another (capital movements to the other coun- 
try).  This  ideal  situation  was  contradicted  by  the  evidence  provided  by 
Feldstein and Horioka. 
Many conventional analyses that have followed the F-H article have main- 
tained the assumption of perfect capital mobility and have asked under what 
circumstances this paradox would occur in a world under perfect information 
and perfect individual rationality. The original F-H article stressed the imper- 
fection of  an international  capital market, but followers have tried to show 
that the paradox can occur even under perfect mobility. They have argued that 
because of the intertemporal recurrence of shocks and international correlation 
of shocks, paradoxical observations could occur, or that because of the imper- 
fection of econometric methodology, a paradox could emerge. I do not know 
how far these approaches can reach. 
On the other hand, the approach taken in this paper is to decompose the 
structure within one tank and to examine what happens inside these obscure 
pipes. I consider this is to be the right direction. This decomposition approach 
Koichi Hamada is professor of  economics at the Economic Growth Center, Yale University. 
This comment is based on the version of the paper that was presented at the conference. 198  Menzie D. Chinn and Michael Dooley 
Fig. 7C.1  Visible or invisible flow of funds 
checks quantity variables of  financial linkage of  various kinds as well as the 
prices (rates of  returns) of  assets. The particular decomposition used in this 
paper is, of course, one among many alternative decompositions. 
Thus, I  agree with the authors’ major methodology because, considering 
separately the linkages in different markets, one can detect where the equaliza- 
tion process of rates of return is blocked. 
Though I am sympathetic with the authors’ overall approach, I had many 
difficulties following the details of this paper. 
Data 
I wonder whether enough care was taken in acquiring the data. The long- 
term prime rate in Japan (fig. 7.6) is far higher than the actual value. (Japanese 
banks would have obtained enormous profits if  the graph had been true.) Ac- 
cording to my  statistics at hand, the short-term rates fluctuated between 4.1 
and 7.2 percent during the  1980s. The call rate, which is equivalent to the 
federal funds rate, fluctuated more. I wish this were the problem only with the 
Japanese data. 
Concepts and Institutional Considerations 
The decomposition used by the authors is a distinction between commercial 
paper or market instruments and bank loans. This decomposition is meaningful 
by  itself, but dwelling on this classification narrows the scope of  the paper. 
There are many important dimensions in the classification of financial assets 199  Asia Pacific Capital Markets 
and markets not covered by their decomposition. There are at least three types 
of distinctions. 
In general, one can classify a market according to whether it is reguhted by 
the government or unregulated with respect to assets and with respect to the 
price formation of the assets. An asset is transferrable in the market from one 
individual to another (market-oriented  asset) or created only between two or 
more related parties (negotiable  asset). Equities, bonds, and commercial paper 
are in the first category. Bank loans are in the second category. There is also a 
distinction between  an asset that has a short-term maturity and an asset that 
has a long-term maturity. Some prices are volatile, and others are sluggish. In 
the paper most of  these characteristics, in particular regulated or deregulated 
aspects, were neglected in the consideration of disaggregation of assets. 
Probably, the authors are comparing market-oriented, but regulated com- 
mercial  paper  with  negotiable,  nonregulated  bank  loans.  But  this  cross- 
characterization changes over time and across countries. (E.g., the interbank 
market in Japan was the least regulated market in terms of interest rates until 
the late  1970s, though it was a restricted  one in the sense that only banks 
could participate.) 
Theory 
The problem is containing a disequilibrium phenomenon within an equilib- 
rium (equality) framework in equations (2) and (3). Since i and p are regulated, 
the notional demand and the notional supply are not equal. As Ito’s rigorous 
work on market disequilibrium indicates, for example, the analysis is difficult. 
But the authors should take account of  disequilibria in a proper framework 
rather  than  compressing  equations  as if  they  were equilibriating  equalities. 
Since i and  p are regulated, the money  market as well as the credit market 
should be credit rationed. 
Empirical Results 
The paper argues that capital inflow will increase funds of banks and will 
increase bank lending. Consider, however, the case where domestic saving in- 
creases. Then, bank lending as well as capital outflow will increase. Thus, de- 
pending on where the exogenous shock is, the directions of movements are not 
obvious. Therefore, it is not surprising that “these estimates of  nonstructural 
relationships are seldom significant”-although  I admire the authors’ honesty. 
The paper also maintains that the spread between the bank lending rate and 
the commercial paper rate is an increasing function of the bank lending be- 
cause riskier and riskier projects are undertaken. Again, one might argue that 
with modernization of the financial market, p -  i declines along with the ob- 
servation of increasing amount of present and past lending. 
Finally, I would like to comment on the last estimates on the validity of the 
money or credit paradigm in various countries. I view the controversy over the 
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looking at the different sides of the balance sheet of the central bank. Thus, 
money and credit should give similar results in normal situations. If constraints 
are strongly binding on one side, then the constraint and, accordingly, the vari- 
able under the constraint should matter more. For example, if credit availability 
is under tight control, the credit paradigm will prevail. 
Because the asset side and the liability side often move together, it is ex- 
pected again that the coefficients of estimated equations are not so significant, 
because of multicollinearity. 
In short, I would like to express my potential appreciation for this paper. If 
proper disaggregation is adopted upon a firm theoretical foundation, this kind 
of approach will contribute much to demystifying the Feldstein-Horioka puz- 
zle. In its present form, though this paper gives some helpful insights, it leaves 
the reader with many doubts and mysteries. 
Comment  Aaron Tornell 
This paper attempts to reconcile two contradicting stylized facts about interna- 
tional capital market integration in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, savings 
retention coefficients indicate low capital mobility for the majority of South- 
east Asian countries. On the other hand, tests of interest rate parity conditions 
indicate high capital mobility among these same countries. 
Typically, studies that test interest rate parity use tradable debt instruments 
such as commercial paper. In Southeast Asian countries, however, a majority 
of firms use bank credit. Therefore, these studies may not present an accurate 
picture of capital market integration, unless bank loans are perfect substitutes 
for commercial paper. The authors show that this is not the case for Southeast 
Asia on the whole. They find that the covariability of bank rates and the com- 
mercial paper rate is not perfect across all Southeast Asian countries. They 
identify three groups of countries: a group with high covariability (Australia, 
Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States), a group with medium 
covariability (Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and the Philippines), and a group 
with no covariability (Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand). 
An important implication of this analysis is the determination of the extent 
to which monetary authorities can sterilize capital inflows. To the extent that 
bank lending is an important link, sterilization is feasible, as shown by  the 
cases of Indonesia and Malaysia, which engaged in large-scale sterilization of 
capital inflows. 
The authors do not discuss the important issue of capital controls. Given that 
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their evidence  shows that there is not much medium- and long-term capital 
mobility in Southeast Asia, what is the optimal policy toward short-run capital 
flows? If capital inflows are short-lived by nature,  should a country  impose 
capital controls, and if so, would this be administratively feasible? In particu- 
lar, given the importance of  bank lending in these economies, what type of 
bank regulation would help stem short-run capital inflows? This Page Intentionally Left Blank